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LEGISLATION
CRIMINAL LAw (SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED MATIERS)
AMENDMENT ACT 32 OF 2007
Chapter 5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related
Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 came into operation on
21 March 2008. This chapter provides for, among other things,
the compulsory HIV testing of certain alleged sex offenders and
contains comprehensive provisions in order to ensure that such
HIV testing is conducted in a sensitive and effective manner both
during the pre-trial and trial stages of criminal proceedings.
Chapter 6 establishes a National Register for Sex Offenders.
This chapter came into operation on 16 June 2008.
Regulations made in terms of sections 39 of the Act were
published in GN R561 GG 31076 of 22 May 2008. These
regulations pertain specifically to chapter 5.
SOUTH AFRICAN JUDICIAL EDUCATION INSTITUTE ACT 14 OF 2008
This Act was assented to by the President on 16 September
2008 (GG 31437 of 16 September 2008). The principal aim of the
Act is to establish a South African Judicial Education Institute to
address the general and long-recognized need for the further
training and education of judicial officers. The Act also aims to
promote the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility,
and effectiveness of South African courts through appropriate
education and training initiatives. It is envisaged that such
training and education will enhance judicial accountability
and the transformation of the judiciary in order to promote
the implementation of the values mentioned in section 1 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (s 2). The Act
comes into operation on a date fixed by the President in the
Government Gazette (s 20).
* BA LLB (Stell) CML (Unisa). Lecturer in the Department of Criminal Justice
and Procedure, University of the Western Cape, Bellvile.
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JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION AMENDMENT ACT 20 OF 2008
The Judicial Service Commission Amendment Act 20 of 2008
amends the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 and
establishes procedures, structures, and mechanisms to deal with
the conduct of judges. In the first instance, a Judicial Conduct
Committee is established to receive and deal with complaints
about judges (s 8 of the Amendment Act). Procedures to deal
with such complaints are also provided for in Part Ill of chapter 2
(ss 14-18 of the Amendment Act). Section 12 obliges the Chief
Justice to compile a Code of Judicial Conduct, in consultation
with the Minister of Justice. This Code will, once accepted by
Parliament, serve as the prevailing standard for all judicial
conduct. The Act also provides for the establishment and mainte-
nance of a register of judges' registrable interests (s 13 of the
Amendment Act) as well as the establishment of Judicial Conduct
Tribunals to inquire into and report on allegations of incapacity,
gross incompetence, or gross misconduct by judges, and related
matters (ss 21-34 of the Amendment Act). The commencement
date has yet to be proclaimed by the President. The reason for
the delayed commencement of the Amendment Act is primarily
the fact that various guidelines, processes, and procedures, as
well as the Code of Judicial Conduct, have to be in place before
the Act can effectively and properly be implemented.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AMENDMENT ACT 25 OF 2008
This Act effects many insertions, substitutions, amendments,
and deletions of provisions of the Correctional Services Act 111 of
1998. It was assented to by the President on 11 November 2008
(GG 31593 of 11 November 2008). Allowance is made for these
amendments to come into operation on different dates to be fixed
by the President by proclamation in the Govemment Gazette.
Some of the changes to the principal Act relate to the manner in
which inmates are detained and the manner in which correctional
centres are managed, the period before an offender may be
placed on parole or correctional supervision, the general func-
tioning of Parole Boards and the Judicial Inspectorate, as well as
matters relating to officials of the Department of Correctional
Services. The Act comes into operation on a date fixed by the
President by proclamation in the Govemment Gazette (s 87(1)).
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RENAMING OF THE HIGH COURTS ACT 30 OF 2008
The Renaming of the High Courts Act provides for the renaming
of all High Courts according to the directions of section 16(6)(a)
of Schedule 6 to the Constitution. The Constitution states that all
courts, including their structure, composition, functioning, and
jurisdiction, and all relevant legislation, must be rationalized with
a view to establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements
of the Constitution. Section 1 of the Renaming of the High Courts
Act consequently provides for the High Courts to be renamed in
order to reflect the different provinces and areas in which the
courts are seated. The new names take effect from 1 March 2009.
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES AMENDMENT ACT 35 OF
2008
This Act amends the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act
37 of 2001, specifically regarding the definition of a 'member of
family' (s 2 of the principal Act). The Amendment Act also
provides that a certificate by the Director-General stating a fact
relating to any question as to whether or not a person enjoys
immunity or privilege in terms of the Act is prima facie evidence of
that fact (s 9 of the principal Act). The Act comes into operation
on a date fixed by the President by proclamation in the Govern-
ment Gazette (s 3).
REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 48 OF 2008
This Act is relevant to the Law of Criminal Procedure during the
pre-trial phases of a criminal trial (especially regarding police
investigations), and during the trial phase of a prosecution
(regarding the admissibility of relevant evidence). The Act
amends the Regulation of Interception of Communications and
Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002 to
provide for new technologies and developments with regard
to information and communications generated through or stored
by electronic media. Section 40 deals exclusively with information
obtained and kept by an electronic communication service
provider who provides a mobile cellular electronic communica-
tions service. Such a service provider is obliged to implement a
process to record and store the Mobile Subscriber Integrated
Service Digital Network (MSISDN) number of the SIM-card of all
South African citizens or permanent residents, as well as non-
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citizens and -residents of South Africa, who request that a
particular SIM-card be activated by the provider (s 40(2) of the
principal Act). The full name, surname, identity number, and
physical address of all such persons must also be recorded and
stored together with the MSISDN number and SIM-card details
(ibid). The service provider is also obliged to verify all information
provided by its clients and conducts this process of recording
and storing information at its own cost (s 40(3) and (4) of the
principal Act).
The Act also places obligations on clients of electronic commu-
nication service providers and owners of SIM-cards. Any cus-
tomer who sells or provides an activated SIM-card to another
person (other than a family member) and the recipient of the card
must immediately, upon conclusion of the transaction, provide
the relevant electronic communication service provider with all
the pertinent information listed above (s 40(5) of the principal
Act). The service provider is, in turn, obliged to verify all the
information and to record and store the information at its own cost
(s 40(6) of the principal Act). Any service provider who fails to
comply with the directives and provisions of the Act is guilty of an
offence and liable on conviction for a fine not exceeding
R110 000 for each day on which such failure to comply continues
(s 51(3)A of the principal Act). Any person or customer of a
service provider who fails to discharge these obligations is
likewise guilty of an offence and faces a fine or imprisonment for a
period not exceeding twelve months (s 51(3)B of the principal
Act).
With regard to existing clients of service providers prior to the
commencement of the Act, a mobile cellular electronic communi-
cations service must, within eighteen months from such date,
record and store the information contemplated in section 40(2) in
respect of all customers whose SIM-cards are activated on its
system, if the information in question has not already been
recorded and stored in terms of section 40 (s 62(6)(a) of the
principal Act). An electronic communication service provider may
also not allow service continuation on its electronic communica-
tion system in respect of any activated SIM-card if the information
has not been recorded and stored at the expiry of the eighteen
month period (s 62(6)(d) of the principal Act). The Act comes into
operation on a date fixed by the President by proclamation in the
Government Gazette (s 7).
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NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY AMENDMENT ACT 56 OF 2008,
AND THE SOUTH ARCAN POLICE SERVICE AMENDMENT ACT 57 OF
2008
The National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act 56 of 2008
amends the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 by
deleting all references to the Directorate of Special Operations
(the 'Scorpions') and any related matters.
The South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008
amends the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 to
provide for the transfer of powers, investigations, assets, budget,
and liabilities of the Scorpions to the South African Police Service.
The Amendment Act also aims to enhance the capacity of the
South African Police Service to prevent, combat, and investigate
national priority crimes and other crimes.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT 65 OF 2008
This Act amends the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to
provide, inter alia, for the continuation of certain phases of a
criminal trial via audiovisual link technology in certain circum-
stances (s 159A of the principal Act). An accused who is older
than eighteen years, is in custody in a correctional facility
pending his or her trial in respect of an offence, has already
appeared in court, whose case has been postponed and who is
required to appear or to be brought before a court in any
subsequent proceedings for either a further postponement of the
case or for consideration of release on bail in terms of sections
60, 63, 63A, 307, and 308A of the principal Act (where the
granting of bail is not opposed by the prosecutor, or where
the granting of bail does not require the leading of evidence) is
not required to appear or to be brought physically before
the court (s 159A(2)). Such an accused may rather, subject to the
provisions of the Act, 'appear' before the court by means of an
audiovisual link, and the accused will be deemed to be physically
before the court, unless the court directs, in the interest of justice,
that the accused appears or be brought physically before it. The
proceedings provided for in section 159A(2) will be regarded as
having been held in the presence of the accused person if,
during the proceedings, that accused person is held in custody
in a correctional facility and is able to follow the court proceed-
ings and the court, in turn, is able to see and hear the accused
person (s 159A(3) of the principal Act). The practical effect of
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section 159A(2) is consequently that the remote point where the
accused is held during the proceedings as described in this
section is regarded as a part of the court (s 159A(4) of the
principal Act). Section 159B sets out the requirements for
the audiovisual appearance by accused persons, and section
159C the technical requirements for the use of an audiovisual
link. Section 159D affirms that the protection afforded to the
communication between an accused person and his or her legal
representative applies also to the communication between an
accused and his or her legal representative(s) via audio link,
audiovisual link, or document transmission.
The Amendment Act further provides for three categories of
criminal records that will fall away as previous convictions or be
expunged. Section 271A(a) and (b) of the principal Act allows
certain previous convictions to fall away after the expiry of ten
years, and after certain conditions have been met. According to
section 271A(a), the conviction of an accused found guilty of any
offence in respect of which the sentence is imprisonment for a
period exceeding six months without the option of a fine, but
where the passing of the sentence was postponed in terms of
section 297(1)(a), or the convicted person was discharged in
terms of section 297(2) without having passed a sentence, or the
convicted person was called upon to appear before the court in
terms of section 297(3), or the convicted person was discharged
with a caution or reprimand in terms of section 297(1)(c), will fall
away after ten years. Section 271A(b) of the Act allows for
previous convictions to fall away where the court convicted a
person of any offence in respect of which the sentence is a period
of imprisonment not exceeding six months without the option of a
fine, and ten years have elapsed after the date of conviction of
the said offence. However, if during that period of ten years the
convicted person was convicted of another offence in respect of
which the sentence was a period of imprisonment exceeding six
months without the option of a fine, the previous conviction will
not fall away.
Section 271 B provides for the expungement of certain criminal
records. There are two main categories of criminal records that
qualify for expungement: Where a court has imposed any of the
sentences listed in section 271B(1)(a) on a person convicted of
an offence, the criminal record of that person must, subject to
paragraph (b) and subsection (2) and section 271 D of the Act,
and on written application of the convicted person to the Director
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General: Justice and Constitutional Development, be expunged
after ten years have elapsed after the date of conviction for that
particular offence. But this does not apply to persons convicted
of sexual offences against children and whose names have been
included in the National Register for Sex Offenders in terms of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment
Act 32 of 2007. It also does not apply to persons convicted of
certain offences in terms of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 and
whose names have been included in the National Child Protec-
tion Register. If the convicted person was further convicted of
another offence during that period, and was sentenced to a
period of imprisonment without the option of a fine, the previous
criminal record(s) cannot be expunged in terms of section 271 B.
A second category of criminal records that may be expunged
in terms of this Act includes the criminal records of persons
convicted of offences under 'Apartheid' legislation enacted
before the Constitution took effect and where these criminal
records have, for some reason, not been expunged automatically
by the head of the Criminal Record Centre. In such instances,
the convicted person may apply to the Director General for a
certificate of expungement to be issued (s 271C). Section 271D
deals with the expungement of criminal records by the Criminal
Record Centre, generally: the head of the Criminal Record Centre
of the South African Police Service (or his or her official represen-
tative) must expunge the criminal record of any person if he or
she is furnished with a certificate of expungement issued by the
Director General, or if that convicted person qualifies for auto-
matic expungement of his or her criminal record in terms of
section 271C(1) The procedure for such expungement is pro-
vided for in section 271D(2).
JUDICIAL MATTERs AMENDMENT ACT 66 OF 2008
The Judicial Matters Amendment Act 66 of 2008 contains
various amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act. Some of the
most important and far-reaching amendments are the provisions
to regulate further the payment of admission of guilt fines and the
release of an accused person on bail, and the appointment of
psychiatrists in cases involving the mental capacity of an
accused person; to provide for the prosecution of persons who
commit offences while on diplomatic duty outside the borders of
South Africa; to regulate the imposition of periodical imprison-
ment; and to regulate further appeals in criminal proceedings
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from a magistrate's court to a High Court, and from a High Court
to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The Amendment Act also amends the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979
to extend the category of persons entitled to engage candidate
attorneys and to increase the fines that may be imposed on
attorneys and candidate attorneys for improper conduct; the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, to insert certain
serious offences in Part I of Schedule 2; the Judges' Remunera-
tion and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001, to regulate
further the service of judges after discharge from active service;
and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of
2004, further to regulate penalties. The Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act of 2007 is
amended to extend the period within which the National Register
for Sex Offenders must be established; the period within which
the National Commission of Correctional Services, the National
Commission of the South African Police Service, and the Director
General: Health must forward particulars in their possession to
the registrar; and the period within which the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development must adopt and table the policy
framework relating to sexual offences in Parliament.
CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
This Act will come into operation on 1 April 2010 or any earlier
date fixed by the President by proclamation in the Government
Gazette (s 100). It will have far-reaching effects on criminal
procedure regarding persons under the age of eighteen years.
The Act effectively establishes a separate, but parallel, criminal
justice system for children who are in conflict with the law and are
accused of committing offences. The Act is mindful of the values
underpinning the Constitution, the scope and nature of interna-
tional instruments, and the obligations of South Africa in terms of
these instruments. Special emphasis is placed on restorative
justice, the present realities of crime in South Africa, the potential
long-term benefits of a less stringent criminal justice system for
troubled youth, the advantages and appropriateness of informal
inquisitorial pre-trial procedures in trials involving the youth,
alternative measures regarding sentencing, and the adjudication
of matters involving children, generally.
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CASE LAW
ARREST
Use of Force
In Motswana v MEC for Safety and Security 2008 (1) SACR 404
(NC), the appellant claimed damages after having been attacked
and bitten by a police dog, a German shepherd dog called
'Rommel'. The attack occurred when the dog's handler assisted
with the lawful arrest of the appellant and the appellant resisted
arrest. In the court below, the magistrate dismissed the appellant's
claim on the basis that the conduct of the dog's handler was justified
in terms of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
On appeal, the court first had to decide whether the use of a
police dog had been reasonably necessary in order to arrest the
appellant, and if such force was proportional in all the circum-
stances. It is generally accepted that where force is necessary to
effect arrest, only the least degree of force reasonably necessary
may be used (Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v
Walters 2002 (2) SACR 105 (CC) at 134g). Three facts weighed
heavily against the respondent in this regard. In the first instance,
two police officers accompanied the handler and were less than
a car's length away at the time of the incident. No explanation
was given during the trial as to why the assistance of the two
police officers was not called upon to effect the arrest. Secondly,
after the first attack the appellant hobbled away to his own car
and the police dog was released again to attack the appellant. It
was clear from the testimony provided that the two police officers
accompanying the handler would have arrested the appellant at
this stage had the police dog been on its leash. Thirdly, the
handler's choice of force - using the police dog rather than
the assistance of the two accompanying policemen - was,
objectively, not the option that would probably have caused the
least injuries to the appellant. The handler testified himself that his
dog was very aggressive and he clearly knew that the dog would
bite the appellant once released (paras [7]-[8.2]). Lacock J
observed that it was disturbing that trained dog handlers
regarded the setting of a police dog on a person as the use of
'minimum force'. He found the setting of a dog on a person for
purposes of arrest to be a grave violation of such a person's
rights to dignity, freedom, and security, in addition to this being an
extremely humiliating act. Police officers should consequently
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exercise the greatest care and responsibility before they use
dogs to apprehend suspects. Where the use of a dog was
justified, the handler should, if at all possible, warn the suspect
that the dog would be used and afford the suspect the opportu-
nity rather to submit to the arrest. The use of a dog as 'minimum
force' was not legally justified within the meaning of section 49(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Act (paras [8.3]-[9.2]).
Without Warrant
In terms of section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act, an arrest
without a warrant constitutes a drastic means of initiating a
prosecution or securing an accused's attendance in court. Such
an arrest without a warrant will be lawful only where the arrestee
committed, or is on reasonable grounds suspected of having
committed, a crime listed in Schedule 1.
In Gel/man v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 (1) SACR 446
(W), the appellant, an attorney and businessman, became
involved in an altercation with one of his employees. The
employee became quite violent and started to damage property
at the place of business, which led the appellant to fear further
attack. The appellant then drew a revolver, pointed it at the
employee, and asked her to leave the premises. A few days later
the appellant was requested to make a statement at the local
police station. He did so voluntarily. He was arrested shortly
afterwards without a warrant on suspicion of having unlawfully
pointed a firearm and committed theft. (The latter charge pertains
to the allegation that the appellant had refused to release the
employee's handbag.) The appellant was escorted back to his
business premises to lock up and was paraded in handcuffs in
front of his employees. He was also held in a cell with other
prisoners for longer than 48 hours. During this spell in detention,
the appellant suffered the humiliation of being seen in the cell by
a number of his fellow attorneys, and he was deprived of access
to his heart medication. In the end the prosecution withdrew the
charges after bail was granted. The appellant's subsequent claim
for damages was dismissed in the court below on the grounds
that his arrest had been lawful, as he was reasonably suspected
of having committed an offence contemplated in Schedule 1.
In Louw v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (2) SACR
178 (T), Bertelsmann J held that with each case falling within
the ambit of section 40, the police are obliged to consider the
availability of less invasive methods to bring a suspect to court.
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However, in Charles v Minister of Justice & others 2007 (2) SACR
137 (W) (also Tsose v Minister of Justice 1951 (3) SA 10 (A)),
Louw was rejected and the court held that no further conditions
may be added for the purposes of an arrest without a warrant
other than those provided for in the Act. And, the existing law
does not demand that any milder method of bringing someone to
court has to be considered or invoked whenever such milder
method would be as effective as an arrest without a warrant (see
(2007) 3 JOR Criminal Procedure 2.3). In Minister of Safety and
Security v Van Niekerk 2008 (1) SACR 56 (CC) (see (2008) 1 JOR
Criminal Procedure 2.1), the Constitutional Court did not resolve
this conflict between Louw and Charles: it thought that Van
Niekerk was not a viable test case as the trial court's judgment
was based on the notion that the lawfulness of an arrest is highly
fact specific. Sachs J also pointed out that nuanced guidelines
for an arrest without a warrant already existed in the form of Police
Standing Orders, and that executive and legislative options are
available should the Minister wish to provide greater guidance to
police officers (para [19]).
In Gellman, Salduker J and Levenberg AJ provided compre-
hensive judicial guidelines to govern arrest without a warrant. The
court held that an interpretation of section 40 that supports
the argument that a policeman always has the right to effect an
arrest without a warrant whenever reasonable grounds of suspi-
cion exist would actually render section 43 of the Act nugatory
and irrelevant. Obtaining a warrant, according to such reasoning,
would actually be an inconvenience that most peace officers
could shrug off whenever they chose to do so. Having reviewed
recent authority on whether arrest without a warrant should be
used only as a last resort, the court suggested the following
approach to determine whether or not to make an arrest without a
warrant: The police officer should consider whether there are
reasonable grounds to suspect that the person to be arrested has
committed a Schedule 1 offence. In making such a determina-
tion, the officer should analyse the available evidence critically. It
will be only in rare circumstances that the officer will be able to
form a reasonable suspicion based only on a witness's state-
ment; the officer should preferably find corroborative evidence
before carrying out the arrest. Where the officer personally
witnessed the events that gave rise to the suspicion, it may be
that no corroborative evidence is necessary. Once the officer has
determined that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
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a Schedule 1 offence has been committed, the officer has to
consider whether there are factors militating in favour of effecting
an arrest without a warrant. Such factors may include the risk of
the suspect absconding or committing further crimes, if the arrest
is delayed in order to obtain a warrant. It is also preferable that a
suspect's attendance at court be secured by means of a sum-
mons, and this method always has to be considered. The
arresting officer should always carefully consider his or her
standing orders. Where he or she exercised a discretion in
violation of such orders, that may in itself indicate that the
discretion was not properly exercised and that the arrest without
a warrant was unlawful (para [97]). However, the court was quick
to warn that these guidelines should not be regarded as absolute
rules and that the court did not intend to be prescriptive. In the
present case, the arrest and subsequent detention of the appel-
lant was unlawful (paras [98]-[100]).
See also Olivier v Minister of Safety and Security & another
2008 (2) SACR 387 (W).
AUTHORIZATION UNDER PREVENTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME ACT
In Moodley & others v National Director of Public Prosecutions
& others 2008 (1) SACR 560 (N), the applicants were charged
with racketeering in terms of section 2(1) of the Prevention of
Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998 ('POCA'). The applicants
brought an application in the regional court to have the authoriza-
tion of the prosecution by the National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions (NDPP) declared invalid. Section 2(4) of the POCA provides
that a person will be charged with committing an offence
contemplated in section 2(1) only if a prosecution is authorized in
writing by the NDPP. The authorization in the present case did not
stipulate the dates on which the alleged offences were commit-
ted, and also omitted to identify the places where the alleged
offences were committed. While the charge sheet was a lengthy
document containing details of each of the charges, the authori-
zation itself was very wide - it covered any act or omission of the
applicants' prior to the date mentioned in it; the only limitation was
that certain sections and subsections of the POCA were set out
(paras [15] and [20]-[24]).
In reviewing a decision of a regional court magistrate, Nichol-
son J (Mtshangase J concurring) held that the section 2(4)
authorization by the NDPP was invalid and of no force and effect.
In fact, if such an authorization were permitted, it would certainly
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lead to abuse (paras [15] and [20]-[24]). The rationale of the
authorization required in section 2(4) was that the ordinary
decision of a prosecutor regarding the prosecution of a case
relating to racketeering was not sufficient, given the importance
and complexity of these sort of charges. The authorization of the
NDPP is consequently pivotal before a prosecution can be
instituted. The NDPP had to apply him- or herself to the informa-
tion in the docket and to the particular charges that emerged from
them before he or she issued an authorization (paras [25]-[37]).
In the present case, the authorization was too broad and lacked
the necessary specificity.
In S v De Vries 2008 (1) SACR 580 (C), the accused likewise
attacked the validity of the section 2(4) authorization. Bozalek J
held that the authorization in the present case was valid; '[the]
POCA does not prescribe the form which such authorization
should take, and the authorization concerned not only the identity
of the accused, but also stated the specific offences in terms of
s 2(1)' (para [33]).
BAIL
In S v Petersen 2008 (2) SACR 355 (C), the appellant appealed
against the Wynberg regional court's refusal to grant her second
application for bail pending the finalization of her trial. Her first
application for bail was brought in terms of section 60(11)(1)(a)of
the Criminal Procedure Act. It states that an accused charged
with a Schedule 6 offence must be detained in custody pending
his or her trial, unless the accused adduces evidence which
satisfies the court that exceptional circumstances exist which, in
the interest of justice, permit his or her release. The exceptional
circumstances relied on by the appellant included the following:
she had a history of severe psychiatric problems; her precarious
mental state' required ongoing psychiatric care, medication, and
support which the prison facilities and services would not be able
to supply; and the needs of her eight-year-old daughter necessi-
tated her pre-trial release. The State opposed this first bail
application on the grounds set out in section 60(4)(a), (b), (c),
and (e), arguing that there was a likelihood that the appellant
would, if released on bail, endanger the safety of the public,
attempt to evade her trial, attempt to influence or intimidate
witnesses, and disturb the public order or undermine the public
peace and security.
The regional court refused to grant the appellant bail. White-
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head AJ, in his judgment on appeal against such refusal, agreed
with the court below that the appellant had failed to establish that
her history of severe psychiatric problems or her precarious state
of health at the time constituted exceptional circumstances as
required by section 60(11)(1)(a). The same applied to her need
for ongoing psychiatric care and the alleged inability of the prison
facilities and services to meet those needs. Regarding the
parental needs of her minor daughter, the court found that
the appellant had actually been unable to care for her daughter
because of her ongoing ill health, and that she relied on two
domestic assistants to act as primary caregivers (para [19]). Not
only was the appellant limited in her ability to give the child
parental care, but there was also the question as to whether
unlimited access to the appellant might prove stressful to the
child (para [20]).
The second bail application, before the same regional magis-
trate who had heard' the first application, was rather more
substantial than the first. It was based on various new factors and
exceptional circumstances requiring the court's consideration
(para [24]). The regional court again refused bail. It was clear to
the court that in an application for bail the burden is on the
accused to adduce evidence and to prove, to the satisfaction of
the court, the existence of exceptional circumstances of such a
nature as to permit the release of the accused on bail. The court
must also be satisfied that the release of the accused on bail is in
the interest of justice (para [54]).
On appeal, it was held that there had been wide-ranging
opinions on the meaning and interpretation of 'exceptional cir-
cumstances' in the context of section 60(11)(a). 'Exceptional',
generally, connotes something unusual, extraordinary, remark-
able, peculiar, or different. The particular context and circum-
stances of a case under consideration may mandate a varying
degree of exceptionality, unusualness, extraordinariness,
remarkableness, peculiarity, or difference. Allowance should
accordingly be made for a certain measure of flexibility in the
judicial approach to the question (paras [55]-[56]). In a second
or subsequent application for bail where an accused relies
on new facts, the court must be satisfied that such facts are
indeed new and that they are relevant to the new application. The
purpose of adducing new facts should not be to address
problems encountered in the previous application or to fill gaps in
previously presented evidence. And where evidence was avail-
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able to the accused at the time of the previous application but for
whatever reason was not adduced, it cannot be relied on in a
later application for bail as new evidence. If, however, the
evidence is new and relevant, it must be considered together with
all the facts placed before the court in the previous bail applica-
tion(s) (paras [57] and [58]).
As to whether an accused should, in the interests of justice, be
released on bail, section 60(4) states five grounds, the existence
of one or more of which would preclude such a release. Section
60(6) enumerates a number of factors which a court may
consider, including any other factor which, in the opinion of the
court, should be considered (s 60(6)(j)). But these provisions do
not affect the right of an accused 'to be released from detention if
the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions',
as provided in section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution. They are
likewise not intended to increase the burden on the accused to
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there are exceptional
circumstances justifying his or her release and that such release
would not prejudice the interests of justice (paras [59] and [60]).
In the present case, the court found that, on an analysis of the
evidence as a whole, old and new, the appellant had not
succeeded in demonstrating that the decision of the regional
court was wrong and should be set aside (para [82]).
CONDUCT OF PRESIDING OFFICER
In S v Phiri 2008 (2) SACR 21 (T), the regional magistrate
constantly criticized the police, the prosecution, the defence, and
a higher court which sought answers to queries concerning the
conduct of a trial. Such conduct was held to be unbecoming.
Also, discourtesy to witnesses and insults hurled with impunity in
facie curiae could not be condoned. The conduct rendered the
proceedings irregular (at 25-6). Examples of the conduct
described as unbecoming and irregular include the following:
The magistrate directed the prosecutor to watch TV and DSTV on
channel 69 and gave lessons to the prosecutor on how to
conduct the prosecution. The magistrate had, for no acceptable
reason, stopped the complainant from answering a question by
the defence. She also stopped the prosecutor from leading
evidence of identity, and instead led the evidence herself. She
had, in respect of at least two State witnesses, taken over the
examination. She explained that completion of at least eighteen
cases per month was needed to keep the court roll under control
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and that the prosecutor was inexperienced. She also said that if
the High Court could provide her with an experienced and
competent prosecutor, she would be able to sit back and listen to
evidence.
In S v Mlimo 2008 (2) SACR 48 (SCA), the appellant attacked
his convictions for murder and attempted murder on three
grounds. The first was that he had not received a fair trial due to
the impatience, confrontational manner, and continuous
descents into the arena of the trial judge. Mthiyane JA (Farlam JA
and Kgomo AJA concurring) was satisfied that the trial judge
participated actively in the proceedings and agreed that there
were undoubtedly times when the trial judge was impatient with
the appellant's attorney. However, after each verbal skirmish
between the trial judge and the attorney, the judge invited the
attorney to proceed with his cross-examination. Also, the attorney
handled the trial judge's impatient interventions with ease, and
was steadfast and never lost his composure. The court was
consequently satisfied that the manner in which the judge
conducted the case had not affected the fairness of the trial.
In S v Maasdorp 2008 (2) SACR 296 (NC), Bosielo AJP
(Makgohloa J concurring) found it unacceptable that a magis-
trate should mero motu instruct a prosecutor to bring an exhibit to
court and receive the exhibit without involving either the prosecu-
tion or the defence.
In Mafongosi v Regional Magistrate, Mdantsane & another
2008 (1) SACR 366 (Ck), the accused's conviction and sentence
were set aside on the basis that the accused's trial had been
unfair, which resulted in a failure of justice. The magistrate
decided and submitted in open court that the accused's right to
legal representation had expired, and that the accused would not
be granted a further remand to secure legal representation. This
declaration was made after many attorneys had previously either
withdrawn or been unable to continue with the case. The accused
agreed to take responsibility for her own representation and the
magistrate accepted this. However, on automatic review,
Ndzondo AJ (Petse J concurring) found this to be 'grossly
irregular': 'The fact that the accused had confirmed in open court
that she would conduct her own defence could not assist the
State as her confirmation had to be considered in the light of what
the magistrate had decided earlier and repeated in open court,
namely that there would be no further opportunity to obtain
another legal representative' (para [25]).
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See also S v Mafu & others 2008 (2) SACR 653 (W).
DATE OF RELEASE
Section 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides
that where a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for a
period exceeding five years but his or her date of release in terms
of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 is not more than five
years in the future, an application may be made to the trial court
for the reconsideration of the sentence. In Price v Minister of
Correctional Services 2008 (2) SACR 64 (SCA), the appellant had
been sentenced in December 2000 to fifteen years' imprison-
ment. After serving four and a half years he launched proceed-
ings in the High Court for a review of the decision of the prison
authorities not to consider him eligible for possible referral for
reconsideration of sentence. The appellant interpreted the to the
'date of release' in section 276A(3)(a)(ii) to be to the earliest
possible date upon which a prisoner becomes eligible to be
considered for placement on parole, or the date of expiration of
sentence, whichever occurred first. The respondent, however,
contended that the 'date of release' meant the date of the
expiration of the prisoner's sentence, less any legal remission of
sentence. A further question for determination was whether the
fact that the appellant had been released on parole in October
2006 precluded him from such consideration in terms of section
276A(3)(a)(ii).
The court found that, at first blush, section 276A(3)(a)(ii)
appears to refer to the date of the expiration of the prisoner's
sentence so that the period of correctional supervision provided
for in that section would similarly not exceed five years. However,
the provisions of the Act and the regulations qualified the wording
of section 276A(3)(a)(ii). In particular, section 63(1)(bXi) pro-
vides, for purposes of the recommendations that a parole board
has to make regarding the possible placement of a prisoner
under correctional supervision, that the date of release contem-
plated in section 276A(3)(a)(ii) is deemed to be the earliest date
on which the prisoner may be considered for parole, or the
date of expiration of sentence, whichever occurred first. How-
ever, this construction had been rejected on two grounds. In the
first instance, the 'date of release' referred to in section 63(1)(b)(i)
was deemed to be the date of release only for purposes of the
recommendations to be made by the parole board, and for no
other purpose. Secondly, it had been held that the construction
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contended for results in serious anomalies which would be
contrary to Parliament's intention that the period during which
a person should be under correctional supervision should not
exceed five years (Steenkamp v Commissioner of Correctional
Services; Maaga & others v Minister of Correctional Services &
others [2005] JOL 13668 (T)). But if this interpretation of the
particular section was accepted, then section 63(1) would serve
no purpose. The court consequently held that the words 'date of
release' in section 276A(3)(a)(ii) connoted, for the purpose of a
prisoner subject to the provisions of the Act, the date on which
such prisoner might be considered for placement on parole, or
the date of his or her release on expiration of the sentence,
whichever occurred first (paras [101-[141). Also, as there were
material differences between release on parole and the possible
consequences of a referral for reconsideration of sentence in
terms of section 276A(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, no
reason existed why a prisoner who had reached his or her parole
consideration date should, as a matter of policy, be denied the
opportunity of having the sentence subsequently reconsidered
(para [15]). And section 276A(3)(a)(ii) applied only to prisoners
- a person released on parole was no longer a prisoner even
though his or her sentence was yet to expire (para [16]).
DUPLICATION OF CONVICTIONS
In S v Whitehead & others 2008 (1) SACR 431 (SCA), the
appellants were convicted in a regional court of public violence
and culpable homicide. The seventh appellant was furthermore
convicted of assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm. All
the appellants were sentenced to five years' imprisonment on
each charge, of which two years were suspended. The seventh
appellant received an additional two years for the assault. All
seven appellants appealed against their convictions and sen-
tences for culpable homicide and against their sentences for
public violence. The seventh appellant appealed against his
assault sentence.
The Supreme Court of Appeal court mero motu raised the issue
as to whether the guilty verdicts on the counts of public violence
and culpable homicide constituted a duplication of convictions.
The court emphasized that there was no infallible formula to
determine whether there had been a duplication of convictions.
The various tests formulated by the courts were not rules of law,
nor were they exhaustive. Also, where the matter could not be
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decided satisfactorily by applying these practical guidelines,
common sense, wisdom, experience, and fairness had to guide
the court (paras [34] and [35]). In contesting multiple convictions,
a court may use an 'evidence test' which enquires whether the
evidence necessary to establish the commission of one offence
involved proving the commission of another offence (paras
[39]-[41]). Courts also sometimes apply the 'intention test', in
terms of which a person is regarded to have committed only one
offence if that person had committed several acts and each act
has the potential to be an offence on its own, but all the acts
together rather constitute a continuous transaction carried out
with a single intent. (The minority opinion in this case ignored
these two tests and argued that where on the charge sheet there
is a duplication, the tests are irrelevant (para [10]).)
The difficulty in the present case, however, was that in the first
count specific reference was made to the unlawful and negligent
killing of a person, a fact which the State proved in order to show
that the conduct of the appellants satisfied the 'serious dimen-
sions' element of the crime of public violence. And with regard to
the second count (culpable homicide), the death of the particular
victim was again the main point of contention. The minority (per
Combrinck JA; Farlam JA concurring) took the view that on
the basis of the rule against the duplication of convictions, the
appellants should not have been convicted on the second count.
The minority found that proof of culpable homicide as part of the
offence of public violence necessarily proved the allegations
in the second count (paras [1]-[13]). The minority sought to
enforce the rule against the duplication of convictions on the
basis that it forms part of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
The majority, by contrast, took the substantive law definitions of
the two offences concerned as its point of departure and held
that the State, in certain instances, will be able to prove the crime
of public violence without any reference whatsoever to the
negligent or intentional killing of another person. But the offence
of culpable homicide is also capable of proof independent of
acts of public violence. The majority consequently held that both
these two propositions hold good in the present matter and the
evidence of the general disturbance caused by the assailants to
the public order would be sufficient to secure a conviction on the
public violence charge. The State was also at liberty then to
continue to prove the offence of culpable homicide.
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DUTY OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS TO ASSIST COURT
In S v Tshabalala 2008 (1) SACR 486 (T), the court noted with
regret that it did not receive full and proper professional assis-
tance from the appellant's legal representative and from the
Director of Public Prosecutions (para [18]). Counsel had not been
able to address the court meaningfully on particular points and
both counsel had delivered heads of argument dealing with
conviction and sentence when it was clear that leave to appeal
had been granted only in respect of sentence. The court then
listed a number of specific failings by the respective counsel. The
court concluded that such poor performance could not be
tolerated and ordered that neither counsel be permitted to
recover fees for their appearance in the matter (ibid).
DUTY OF POLICE OFFICERS TO REPORT CRIMES
In S v Pakane & others 2008 (1) SACR 518 (SCA), the
appellants (two police officers) were aware of a shooting in which
another senior police officer was involved but chose not to report
the incident. By not reporting the incident the appellants tried to
assist the perpetrator to avoid conviction. The Supreme Court of
Appeal found such inaction by police officers to be unaccept-
able, and that it resulted in the appellants being guilty as
accessories to the shooting. The court found that a police
officer's duty to report crimes flowed from both section 205(3) of
the Constitution and section 13(2) of the South African Police
Service Act 68 of 1995 (para [30]). In terms of the latter section, a
police officer is required to report an offence to his or her
commanding officer as soon as he or she becomes aware of the
unlawful conduct. However, the appellants claimed that they
could not adhere to the requirement in section 13(2), as the
person responsible for the unlawful shooting was also their
commanding officer. Maya JA (Mthiyane JA and Hurt AJA concur-
ring) held that such an interpretation of section 13(2) was 'a
brazen perversion of the section' and that it 'would be absurd to
accept that the officers honestly believed that they had no
obligation to report the shooting incident because they were with
their commanding officer when it occurred' (para [31]).
EXTRADITION
In S v Stokes 2008 (2) SACR 307 (SCA), the South African
government requested the government of the United States of
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America provisionally to arrest the appellant with a view to his
extradition. The appellant, after his arrest, waived his rights under
the applicable extradition treaty, was extradited from the United
States, and was charged with one count of theft and three counts
of fraud (alternatively, theft) upon his arrival in South Africa. The
appellant submitted that he could not be charged with these
offences, as they were not the offences in respect of which his
extradition had been sought. It was also contended that despite
the provisions of section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Act, each
of the thefts which the appellant allegedly committed must first be
proved. Also, as the names of only three of the thirteen persons
mentioned in the indictment had been mentioned in the applica-
tion for his provisional arrest, it was submitted that a charge of
theft in respect of the remaining ten persons must be excluded in
terms of section 19 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962.
The court held that the word 'sought' in section 19 could not
have been intended to mean anything other than 'successfully
sought'. If the word 'sought' were interpreted differently, it would
result in the anomaly that a fugitive could be prosecuted in
respect of offences that neither the requested state nor the
fugitive himself consented to. Moreover, to interpret 'sought' to
relate to offences for which extradition was required but not
disclosed to the requested state or the fugitive would have an
equally anomalous result (para [10]). The accused in this case
could thus be prosecuted only for those offences mentioned in
the application for his provisional arrest and on the strength of
which the accused waived his rights in terms of the applicable
extradition treaty (paras [11]-[14]).
FAILURE OF REGIONAL COURT TO APPOINT ASSESSORS IN MURDER
TIAL
In S v Naicker 2008 (2) SACR 54 (N), a regional court had failed
to apply section 93ter(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of
1944, which requires a regional court magistrate to appoint two
assessors to assist him or her in a murder trial. The assessors
need not have experience in the administration of justice. And
where the accused requests that the trial proceeds without
assessors, this request may be adhered to or the magistrate may
exercise a discretion to appoint one or two assessors. In Naicker,
though, the accused did not request the trial to proceed without
any assessors.
As it was trite that section 93ter(1)(a) is couched in peremptory
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terms, the primary issue for decision was whether this type of
irregularity constituted a failure of justice and required the
conviction and sentence to be set aside (at 57-8, 60, and 61-2).
The policy consideration underlying the compulsory appointment
of assessors in regional court murder trials was aimed at facilitat-
ing the participation of lay assessors from other racial groups in
the administration of the criminal justice system, which had
hitherto been perceived as predominately white. Assessors
would thus not always be of any real assistance to a regional
court in reaching a final decision on factual issues relating to the
guilt or innocence of an accused. Thus, despite the peremptory
wording of section 93ter(1)(a), a failure to comply with it is not so
serious and fundamental as to vitiate the proceedings (ibid; see
also S v Gambushe 1997 (1) SACR 638 (N)).
FAIR TRIAL
In S v Toba & another 2008 (1) SACR 415 (E), the appellants
were convicted in a regional court of rape and sentenced to 36
months' correctional supervision and to seven years' imprison-
ment conditionally suspended for five years. The appellants
appealed against their convictions and applied to have the
matter referred back to the regional court for further evidence.
Their case for remittal was based on the allegation that they did
not have a fair trial and that their attorney had not conducted their
defence properly. They further alleged that their attorney had
closed their cases without their having testified.
The prerequisites for a successful application for remittal
include the following: there should be some reasonably sufficient
explanation why the evidence sought to be led had not been led
at trial; there should also be a prima facie likelihood of the truth of
the evidence; and the evidence should be materially relevant
to the outcome of the trial. Once issues of fact had been judicially
investigated and pronounced upon, further evidence would be
permitted only in special circumstances (at 419-20). With regard
to the allegation that the legal representative had not conducted
the appellants' defence properly, it is trite that such a situation
might indicate that the accused persons did not have a fair trial.
But from the evidence and trial record it was evident that the
attorney had studied the docket and was actually well prepared
for the case. Also, the decision not to allow the appellants to
testify had actually been discussed with them. The attorney
indicated that he, as an experienced attorney, was of the opinion
312
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
that the appellants would not stand up to cross-examination, and
that this opinion had been discussed with the appellants.
It is evident from Toba that a defence lawyer cannot make a
unilateral decision about whether a client should testify in his or
her own defence. Legal representatives should consult with their
clients and provide them with the necessary information about
their right to testify or to refuse to testify, as part of the general
duty to assist clients in their defence strategy.
In S v Tandwa & others 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA), the accused
alleged that he and his counsel had initially agreed that he would
testify, but that his counsel later changed his mind and decided
that the accused should not testify. The accused alleged that he
had incompetent counsel who had given incorrect advice, which
resulted in an unfair trial. In his own defence, counsel stated in an
affidavit appended to the State's written heads of argument that
he had fully advised the accused of the consequences of giving,
or not giving, evidence, and that the accused readily accepted
his advice and elected not to testify. The primary question for
decision was whether or not the failure of representation com-
plained of by the first appellant had actually occurred. The
Supreme Court of Appeal noted that the assertion and counter-
assertion were both on affidavit, and that neither deponent had
been cross-examined. It held that the appeal court was not
helpless - it was possible to explore two unprobed counter-
assertions in order to establish the truth, and the court had the
inherent power to develop a mechanism to allow this. Such a
procedure would, however, be required only where the
accused's allegations raised a legal possibility that there had
been incompetence or misconduct on the part of the legal
representative. It was held that no further enquiry was necessary,
as the accused's allegations were so weak, contradictory, and
inherently improbable that they could be rejected (paras
[21]-[26]).
In S v Shaik & others 2008 (1) SACR 1 (CC), it was contended,
inter alia, that the applicants' rights to a fair trial had been
infringed in that one of the beneficiaries of corrupt payments from
the first applicant, as well as a company and another individual,
had not been joined as co-accused in the prosecution - as
corruption was a reciprocal crime, a joint trial should have been
held. The Constitutional Court held that the appellants should
have raised this concern in the High Court and/or Supreme Court
of Appeal, as all the information necessary to enable them to raise
313
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
such a constitutional complaint was already available to them at
that stage of the proceedings. It is trite that some irregularities
may result in a failure of justice and an unfair trial, but not every
irregularity has this effect (para [44]). Moreover, while there may
be cogent reasons for holding joint trials, this does not mean that
a specific trial would be unfair simply because other possible
perpetrators were not charged together with a particular accused
person. In the present case, the Constitutional Court found that it
was speculative to argue that the joinder of other accused
persons to the trial would have been to the applicants' advantage
and that the non-joinder was to their detriment (paras [47] and
[48]). Even where a particular accused was disadvantaged by
the fact that someone else was not charged in the same trial, this
alone cannot render the trial unfair: ' the proposition cannot
be upheld that the failure to charge another party, who may be
suspected to be involved in the same offence, in the same trial
together with an accused amounts to a breach of any established
rules of criminal procedure and thus to an irregularity of the kind
that would result without more in a failure of justice, render a trial
unfair and require a conviction to be set aside on appeal' (para
[50]).
FATAL IRREGULARITY
It is trite that where an accused is represented by a legal
representative who has no right of appearance, it is a fatal
irregularity that vitiates the proceedings. In S v Diamini en 'n
ander 2008 (2) SACR 202 (T), the court had to decide whether it
would also vitiate the proceedings if an attorney is suspended by
the Law Society during the course of a trial but continues to
represent the accused. Prinsloo J (Jooste AJ concurring) held
that lack of the right to appear during a part of the trial still taints
the proceedings to the extent that it should be set aside in its
entirety. The circumstances of the present case were such that no
real attempt could be made to separate the tainted from the
untainted.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL
In S v Stenge 2008 (2) SACR 27 (C), it was held that a long list
of previous convictions does not necessarily support a declara-
tion in terms of section 286 of the Criminal Procedure Act that
the accused is a habitual criminal. It should be borne in mind that
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force of habit is not the only reasonable inference that can be
drawn from a long list of frequent previous convictions. The
socio-economic conditions of the offender and all other relevant
factors that motivated the person to commit offences is central to
a declaration in terms of section 286: 'Precisely because the
appellant is effectively being punished for his previous convic-
tions as well as for the present one, it is important to know the
circumstances under which they were committed before a decla-
ration is made' (para [24]).
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIME
At the request of the National Director of Public Prosecutions
(NDPP), the Durban High Court issued a letter of request in terms
of section 2(2) of the International Co-operation in Criminal
Matters Act 75 of 1996. The letter requested the Attorney-General
of Mauritius to transmit to the NDPP original documents, together
with the statements of authentication. The applicants in Thint
Holdings (SA) (Pty) Ltd & another v National Director of Public
Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions
2008 (2) SACR 557 (CC) argued that section 2(2) did not apply,
and that rather section 2(1) applied to the matter. (Section 2(2)
provides for the issue of a letter of request for purposes of a
criminal investigation, whereas section 2(1) provides for its issue
during a criminal trial.) Although the criminal proceedings against
the applicants had been struck off the roll, the matter was still
pending and section 2(2) thus applied. The applicants also
raised a number of other issues pertaining to the letter issued in
terms of section 2(2), including that their right to a fair trial under
section 35(3) of the Constitution had been violated, as well as
their access to the courts in terms of section 34 of the Constitu-
tion. The applicants also submitted that the Supreme Court of
Appeal did not apply section 39(2) of the Constitution, and that
the issue of the letter of request did not comply with the principle
of legality, primarily as it was not established that the issue of the
letter was in the interests of justice.
The court began by considering two legal questions. The first
concerned the proper interpretation of section 2(2) in order to
determine whether the State could use this provision to procure
original documents of which it already had copies. The second
was whether the fact that the applicants had previously been
charged, though the case had been struck off the roll, prevented
the State from using section 2(2) in this case. Here, the NDPP
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sought to obtain the original documents to ensure that there
would be no dispute as to the documents' admissibility during the
trial. The applicants contended, however, that section 2(2) could
not be invoked to obtain evidence but merely to obtain informa-
tion for the purposes of the investigation. The applicants based
this contention on the fact that section 2(1) referred to 'evidence',
whereas section 2 (2) referred to 'information', and that as the
NDPP already had copies of the seized documents, they would
not obtain any new 'information' from the originals. The Constitu-
tional Court found, however, that an investigation consisted of two
simultaneous processes - the first, to determine whether a crime
had been committed, and the second, to gather evidence to
prosecute the crime. The narrow understanding of 'investigation'
which the applicants suggested referred only to the first of the
two processes would ascribe a meaning to section 2(2) that was
incompatible with the manner in which criminal investigations
were undertaken. A more functional and appropriate understand-
ing of section 2(2) would recognize that the two processes were
intertwined and that section 2(2) should give effect to that close
relationship (paras [32]-[39]).
However, the applicants were correct in their submission that
the NDPP could not use section 2(2), as the case against the
applicants had been struck off the roll. Once a case was struck
off the roll it terminated and could not be re-enrolled, but rather
had to start afresh (paras [41]-[46]). The Constitutional Court
made the following obiter remark (para [47]):
'The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants did not
have standing to challenge the issue of the letter of request. It
concluded that the process of obtaining information is a preliminary
process that does not affect the rights of the applicant. In our view, this
is a matter that does not need to be decided in this case and we
accordingly refrain from doing so. We should note, however, that our
Constitution has adopted a broad approach to questions of standing.
We wish to make it clear that we are not persuaded that the approach
of the Supreme Court of Appeal is necessarily correct given our
constitutional approach to standing.
JURISDICTION
Section 89(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act determines juris-
diction for purposes of trial. Until a court is seized with a trial, the
question of jurisdiction cannot arise. Section 75 of the Criminal
Procedure Act makes it clear that a case cannot be transferred to
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a regional court or High Court unless the prosecutor so requests
(S v Khalema and Five Similar Cases 2008 (1) SACR 165 (C)).
POWER TO STOP A PROSECUTION
In S v Gouws 2008 (2) SACR 640 (T), the prosecutor closed the
State's case without calling any witnesses after the accused had
pleaded not guilty to a charge of defeating the ends of justice,
and after a number of postponements. In the prosecutor's
opinion, the accused had pleaded to the wrong charge. The
magistrate, in turn, found the accused not guilty and discharged
him. On special review, it was submitted that the prosecutor's
actions amounted to stopping the prosecution, and, in terms of
section 6(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, this could be done
only with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
It is trite that a mere acceptance of a plea cannot amount to a
stoppage of the prosecution in the manner contemplated by
section 6(b). There is further no duty on a court to enquire from a
prosecutor who accepted an accused's plea or decided to
call no further witnesses whether that prosecutor was stopping
the proceedings: 'All that the prosecutor was doing under the
circumstances was to leave the matter to the court to decide'
(para [22]). Where a prosecution was halted by the withdrawal of
the charge before plea in terms of section 6(a), the accused was
not entitled to an acquittal and could not plead autrefois acquit if
charged again. Section 6(b), by contrast, dealt with prosecutions
halted after an accused's plea: the plea of autrefois acquit would
then ordinarily be available to the accused (paras [23] and [24]).
In the present case, the prosecutor had not acted inappropri-
ately and had not purported to act in terms of section 6(b) - he
had merely exercised a day-to-day discretion (paras [25] and
[26]).
POWERS OF REVIEW COURT
S v Nkosi 2008 (1) SACR 87 (N) came before the Natal
Provisional Division on automatic review. The accused had been
convicted of robbery in a magistrate's court and sentenced to
three years' imprisonment, suspended on condition that he was
not again convicted of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft
committed during the period of suspension. It was clear from the
evidence at the trial, however, that the accused had acted very
violently when he committed the robbery: he threatened the
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complainant with a knife, throttled him, and stabbed him. On
review, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted
a memorandum alleging that the facts, coupled with the
accused's previous convictions, placed the matter beyond
the penal jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, which required the
trial magistrate to exercise his discretion to stop the proceedings
and to commit the accused for sentence by a regional court in
terms of section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Act and section 51
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (in the magis-
trate's court, the Amendment Act was not brought to the
accused's attention and the sentence was not invoked in terms of
this Act).
Section 304(2)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers a
review court, generally, to give such a judgment, impose such a
sentence, or make any other order as the magistrate's court
ought to have given, imposed, or made. This particular provision
has been construed by the courts as not to include the power
to increase a competent sentence imposed by a magistrate or to
remit the case to the magistrate's court for such purpose (at
89-90, and 90c). The anomaly consequently exists that an
appeal court may increase a sentence on appeal, but a review
court may not, even where to do so is imperative to meet the ends
of justice. The following two reasons have been advanced for the
existence of this anomaly. In the first instance, section 310 of
the Criminal Procedure Act is said adequately to provide for
supervision of the sentencing function and to ensure balance
in the sentencing process. Secondly, the undesirability of placing
the convicted person again in peril after the conclusion of his
case is crucial. The court held that neither reason was convincing
where the sentence of the lower court was disturbingly inappro-
priate by reason of its being unduly light. Empowering the court
on review by legislative provisions to allow the convicted person
to be heard would place such a person in no greater peril than
that which was occasioned by the right of the prosecution to
appeal against sentence in terms of section 310A after conclu-
sion of the trial, or to seek an increase of sentence on cross-
appeal. Also, although the prosecution's right of appeal would
appear to provide an adequate mechanism to supervise the
process of sentencing, good reason for empowering the review
court to increase the sentence in appropriate cases becomes
apparent when there has been an improper failure by the
prosecution to exercise its right of appeal, as appears to have
occurred in this matter (at 90).
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The proceedings in the lower courts are reviewed to establish
whether their results were obtained in accordance with justice
and, if not, to correct them. Corrections should also include
increasing a sentence that is too light: a sentence that is too light
because the proceedings were not in accordance with justice is
as contrary to law and the ideal of justice as a sentence that, for
the same reason, is too heavy (SE van der Merwe (gen ed), E du
Toit, FJ de Jager, A Paizes & A St Q Skeen Commentary on the
Criminal Procedure Act 30-16).
In S v Greyling 2008 (1) SACR 537 (E), the accused was
convicted on four counts of fraud. In each case the sum involved
was about R3 600, and on each count the accused was sen-
tenced to a fine of R2 000 or six months' imprisonment, wholly
suspended on condition that the accused repay the various
complainants. The magistrate realized that the sentence imposed
gave rise to the absurdity that it would be more advantageous to
the accused to pay the fine than to repay the complainants. The
matter was sent to the High Court on special review. The court
held that while the sentence might be absurd and illogical, it was
neither incompetent nor incapable of being understood or imple-
mented. Accordingly, the court was unable to interfere with the
sentence on review, especially since it appeared that the magis-
trate wanted the sentence to be increased, and it was trite that
the court could not increase sentences on review (at 537-8).
RESERVATION OF QUESTION OF LAw
In S v Dawlatt 2008 (1) SACR 35 (N), it was held that while
section 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for an
application for leave to appeal on the basis of either questions of
fact or questions of law, if a question of law was already dealt with
in a previous, unsuccessful application, and it was concluded
that no prospect of success on appeal exists, an application for
the reservation of the same question of law in terms of s 319
of the Act will be refused (para [25]).
ROLE OF PROSECUTOR DURING PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION PHASE
In S v Shaik & others 2008 (1) SACR 1 (CC), it was contended,
inter alia, that the applicants' rights to a fair trial, equality, and
dignity had been infringed. They alleged, inter alia, that the
prosecutor was guilty of misconduct for overstepping the line
between prosecution and investigation in a number of instances
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by overseeing search and seizure operations in Mauritius, by
assisting Mauritian officials to prepare an application to that
country's Supreme Court, by assisting the Mauritian police to
identify material documents for seizure, and by interrogating
employees of the corporate accused in terms of section 28 of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. The Constitutional
Court noted that the Act provides for the overlapping of certain
functions, and that it cloaks prosecutors with more authority than
just the institution of cases. In terms of section 7(4)(a)(ii), an
Investigating Directorate is established and provision is made for
prosecutors to assist this directorate (paras [54]-[56]). While the
Constitution requires prosecutors to remain impartial and to
execute their functions without fear, favour, or prejudice they are
entitled to assist any investigating team (paras [57]-[68]). The
applicants' contentions were dismissed.
Shortly after the Constitutional Court's decision in Shaik the
Supreme Court of Appeal also held that the fact that a prosecutor
had fulfilled the dual role of interrogator and prosecutor did not
per se render the trial unfair. In Director of Public Prosecutions,
Western Cape v Killian 2008 (1) SACR 247 (SCA), Howie P,
writing for a full bench, stated that '[u]nfairness does not flow
axiomatically from a prosecutor's having had that dual role' (para
[28]).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Innocent Owner Defence
A preservation order was granted under section 38(2) of the
POCA to preserve, inter alia, a farm and a trailer. An application
for the forfeiture of this property in terms of section 50(1) of the
POCA was then brought. In National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions v Mazibuko & others 2008 (2) SACR 611 (N), the first and
second respondents conceded the submission by the NDPP that
the property was an instrumentality of an offence but submitted
that the proportionality argument favoured the applicant. The
legal question in this case was whether or not the first and second
respondents were innocent owners as contemplated by section
52(2A) of the POCA. The burden of proof for an exclusion from
forfeiture in terms of the innocent owner defence in section
52(2A) is on the party seeking the release of the assets from
forfeiture. The standard is a balance of probabilities. The purpose
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of chapter 6 of the POCA is, inter alia, to recruit property owners
into an active role as guardians of their property against crime.
In the present case, the court held that the first respondent had
failed to act with the degree of vigilance and care required by
section 52(3) of the POCA and had thus failed to discharge the
burden of proof on him in terms of section 52(2A)(a) (paras [5]
and [33]-[41]).
With regard to the farm being an asset in the joint communal
estate of the respondents, the court found that while an innocent
spouse, married in community of property, may have to help pay
damages arising out of contract or delict, it was questionable
whether such a spouse should have to pay for the criminal
conduct of his or her spouse. Yet, as many crimes relating to the
person or property are also delicts and actionable, it is not
anomalous that the second respondent should forfeit her half
share in the farm in a seizure of this nature (paras [42], [47], [52],
[60], and [63]). If the opposite were true and the second
respondent's half share in the farm were safe from forfeiture, the
anomalous position would arise that the first respondent would
still own an undivided half share in that part by virtue of the
marriage being in community of property. The second respon-
dent could also apply to court for a division of the joint estate and,
on divorce, could ask for an order that divided the estate in such
a way that her loss of the farm would be recouped from other
assets. Such recourse against the second respondent's husband
is a lesser evil than that of depriving creditors of the redress
stipulated in the statute and at common law (paras [64]-[66]).
Preservation Order Even Though Warrant Invalid
In National Director of Public Prosecutions & another v Maho-
med 2008 (1) SACR 309 (SCA), the appellants appealed against
an order of the High Court in terms of which they had been
directed to return to the respondent various documents, records,
data, and other material seized under two search and seizure
warrants that had earlier been issued in terms of section 29 of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (Mahomed v
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SACR 495 (W)).
The material was the property of the respondent, an attorney, and
purportedly related to an ongoing investigation into the possible
unlawful activities of one of her former clients and a company. The
respondent claimed privilege in respect of all but three of the
items seized.
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The majority of the court held that no court had the power to
make a preservation order for the purpose which the appellants
indicated as their reason why the material should be made
available to them (the appellants submitted that the material
should be made available to them in order to establish whether or
not the particular individual and the company committed the
offences, or proving the same). However, the retention by the reg-
istrar of the High Court of such material or copies of it, even if not
viewed, would be a continuing violation of the respondent's
privacy (paras [17] and [18]). While it was so that sections 38 and
172(1) of the Constitution gave courts the power to fashion
remedies for constitutional violations, this power was given to
enable courts to vindicate rights, not to deny them. The power
to create remedies to redress constitutional violations was conse-
quently not capable of being used to deny such redress in order
to serve some other purpose (paras [19]-[22]).
The second purpose for which the preservation of the material
was sought placed the appellants' arguments on firmer ground.
The material seized under the warrants related to the affairs of a
particular person, whose legal representatives had already
advised the appellants that if that person were ever brought to
trial, the ability of the State to afford that person a fair trial would
be contested on the grounds that the prosecution had had
access to privileged material. And, if this were to happen, the
correct identification of what had been among the seized docu-
ments would be crucial for the just adjudication of that person's
objection. Thus the preservation of the material was not sought so
that its content could be used in a prosecution, but so that a court
might be in a position to identify with certainty what material was
seized. Since everyone, including the State, has the right to a fair
hearing and to have factual disputes resolved expeditiously and
justly, ample authority exists for a court to order, in appropriate
circumstances, that evidence be preserved to achieve this end
(paras [27]-[31]).
It was also stressed that a court was bound to exercise its
power with regard to the making of a preservation order within the
constraints of section 36 of the Constitution. The benefit that
would flow from allowing the intrusion upon protected rights had
to be weighed against the loss that the intrusion would entail.
Only if the benefit outweighed the loss to an extent that met the
standard set by section 36 would the court be permitted to order
the intrusion. In the present case it was held that the limitation of
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the respondent's right to privacy was negligible considering
that the material would be held by the Registrar under lock and
key. The benefit of the expeditious and just resolution of any
dispute concerning the identity of the material was self evident
and enormous, and clearly outweighed the loss to the respondent
(paras [32] and [33]).
Ponnan JA dissented. He stated that the State could not be
permitted to benefit from its own unlawful conduct and found that
the seized items should not be retained in the hands of the
Registrar.
In Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions &
others; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions & others
2008 (2) SACR 421 (CC), the search and seizure operations in
question were found to be lawful and the Constitutional Court did
not have to resolve the issue with regard to a preservation order.
The court did make the following comments about preservation
orders in the interest of justice. It stated that an order for the
preservation of seized material would frequently be a just and
equitable remedy in situations where a court concluded that a
search warrant issued under section 29 of the National Prosecut-
ing Authority Act was unlawful. Such an order is sanctioned by
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution: it states that a court, in
deciding a constitutional matter, can make any order that is just
and equitable, including an order suspending a declaration of
invalidity. According to section 172(1)(b), an ongoing violation
of a right, pending rectification, is consequently possible (paras
[217]-[220]).
It is primarily the trial court's concern to ensure trial fairness,
generally, and the admissibility of evidence, in particular, includ-
ing the balancing of the need to protect the right to privacy, on the
one hand, and important public considerations, on the other.
Thus, when a court finds a section 29 warrant to be unlawful, that
court should preserve the evidence so that the trial court can
apply its discretion under section 35(5) of the Constitution to
decide whether or not to admit evidence obtained by means of
that warrant: 'It is only in instances where an applicant can
identify specific items, the seizure of which constitutes a serious
breach of privacy that affects the inner core of the personal or
intimate sphere, or where there had been some particularly
egregious conduct in the execution of the warrant, that a preser-
vation order should not be granted' (paras [222] and [223]).
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Validity of Search Warrants
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma & another
2008 (1) SACR 258 (SCA), a majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal upheld an appeal against the judgment of Hurt J in which
search warrants granted in terms of section 29 of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act were declared invalid (Zuma v National
Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D)). The
majority (per Nugent JA; Ponnan and Mlambo JJA concurring)
pointed out that the validity of a warrant is determined by the
requirements of the authorizing statute. It was held that two
criteria for validity apply to every warrant for search and seizure
on account of its nature alone: the warrant must be intelligible, as
it must be possible to determine, with certainty, the scope of its
authority, and the warrant must authorize no more than what was
permitted by its authorizing statute. If it purported to authorize
what it was not permitted to authorize, it would be invalid to the
extent of the excess and wholly invalid if the good could not
be severed from the bad (paras [76] and [78]). In applying
the above principles and after having analysed section 29, the
warrants in the present case were found to express intelligibly
and with certainty the scope of the authority that they confer. The
appeal was consequently upheld with costs (paras [88]-[90]).
In Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions (supra), a
special investigator in the employ of the Directorate of Special
Operations applied for and obtained 21 search and seizure
warrants issued in terms of section 29(5) and (6) of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act. Most of the warrants were executed
simultaneously. Some three months later the applicants were
indicted to stand trial on charges of corruption. While the second
applicant obtained an order in the Durban High Court declaring
certain of the warrants invalid, the first applicant was unsuccess-
ful in the Pretoria High Court in a similar application. Both these
rulings were appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned
the judgment of the Durban High Court and upheld that of the
Pretoria High Court. The applicants then approached the Consti-
tutional Court to have the orders of the Supreme Court of Appeal
set aside. Nine legal issues were identified: whether it was in the
interest of justice to grant leave to appeal; whether the prosecu-
tion should have notified the applicants of the application for the
issue of the warrants; whether the prosecution had failed to
disclose various material facts in that application; whether the
prosecution's affidavit had established the need for a search and
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seizure operation under section 29; whether the affidavit should
have expressly justified the need to seize every class of items
mentioned in the annexure to it; whether the warrants were
overbroad or unduly vague; whether the warrants had been
unlawful for any other reason, including the presence of 'catch-
all' paragraphs and the lack of explicit reference to section
29(11); whether the warrants had been executed in a way that
provided insufficient protection for the applicant's legal profes-
sional privilege; and, if the search and seizure operations were
unlawful, whether the court should grant a preservation order or
order that the seized items be returned to the applicants (see also
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mahomed (supra)).
With regard to whether the prosecution should have notified
the applicants of the application for the issue of the warrants, the
Constitutional Court held that the default position was that an
application in terms of section 29 could be made without notice to
the affected parties. Section 29(4) states expressly that premises
may be entered only under a search warrant 'issued in chambers'
- this indicates that the procedure is ordinarily without notice.
Section 29(1) refers to the Investigating Director entering pre-
mises 'without prior notice', which also confirms the interpretation
that no notice in advance is required. The court also found that
this interpretation of the particular provision is in accordance with
common sense: if suspects were to receive notice of an impend-
ing search, it is highly likely that they will remove or destroy the
incriminating evidence (paras [96]-[100]).
The duty of utmost good faith of the applicant in an ex parte
application to place all the relevant materials before the court was
emphasized by the Constitutional Court, but it was accepted that
an investigator cannot be expected to disclose facts of which he
or she is completely unaware. The duty was limited to material
facts. Where there was no crystal-clear distinction between facts
that were material and facts that were not, the applicant had to
judge which facts might influence the judicial officer and which
were sufficiently relevant to justify inclusion. This test for material-
ity should not be set at a level that rendered it practically
impossible for the State to comply with its duty of disclosure, or
which would result in applications being so voluminous that they
would swamp ex parte judges (para [102]).
The validity of the warrants, and specifically whether they were
unduly vague and overbroad, must be assessed in the light of the
common-law principle that a warrant must convey intelligibly to
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searcher and searched the ambit of the search it authorizes, and
in the light of the Bill of Rights and relevant constitutional
principles. Section 29(1) is qualified by section 29(2), which
provides that any search operation must be conducted with strict
regard to decency, order, and the searched person's rights to
dignity, freedom, and security of the person and personal privacy
(paras [137]-[146]). It was also suggested that search warrants
need not always be drafted in terms that everyone subjectively
understands, nor do such warrants necessarily define the scope
of the search in an absolutely exhaustive or perfect way (paras
[148]-[150]). The test for intelligibility cannot be subjective (it
would render search warrants practically unworkable) but should
rather be objective, requiring warrants to be reasonably intelli-
gible in the sense that they are reasonably capable of being
understood by a reasonably well-informed person with a grasp of
the relevant empowering legislation and the nature of the
offences under investigation (paras [151]-[157]).
It is also not permissible to consider sources beyond the
warrant in order to determine its general ambit and intelligibility.
A warrant issued in terms of section 29 should state at least the
following, in a manner that is reasonably intelligible without
recourse to external sources of information: the statutory provi-
sion in terms of which it was issued; to whom it was addressed;
the power it conferred upon the addressee; the suspected
offences under investigation; the premises to be searched; and
the classes of items that were reasonably suspected to be in or
on the premises (paras [159]-[160]). In the present case the
court concluded that the warrants were neither too vague nor too
broad, and that they were reasonably intelligible to both searcher
and searched (paras [164]-[173]).
Section 29(11) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act
enables a court to determine quickly and finally whether an item
is actually privileged, in a way that protects the item against the
risk of loss, damage, or destruction. The wider the application of
section 29(11), the greater the benefit to the State, as it would
ensure that non-privileged items do not slip through the net. But
the application of section 29(11) is limited to the search and
comes to an end with the completion of a search. Search
warrants need not make specific mention of section 29(11), as
there is no benefit to a person being searched in being notified of
these particular provisions. Only once a person claims privilege
does section 29(11) come into operation, and the failure to follow
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its procedure is unlawful. Where a person did not claim privilege
because that person did not realize that the items were privi-
leged, the ordinary common-law protection of privileged docu-
ments persists and privilege can accordingly be claimed later
(paras [188]-[195]).
SENTENCE
Accused Pimary Caregiver of Minor Children
In S v M (Centre for Child Law as arnicus curiae) 2008 (3) SA
232 (CC), the applicant was a 35-year-old divorced mother of
three boys aged eight, twelve, and sixteen. The applicant was
convicted of 38 counts of fraud and sentenced to four years'
imprisonment. The magistrate considered various factors before
imposing the sentence. These included the applicant's previous
criminal record for fraud, and the fact that the applicant had
received a fine and suspended sentence in 1996 and, during the
period of suspension, she had again been charged with fraud. In
addition, while out on bail on those charges, the applicant again
committed fraud. The High Court imposed a sentence of impris-
onment in terms of section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure
Act, which resulted in the convicted becoming eligible for release
under correctional supervision only after having served eight
months' imprisonment. In this case, the main concern was the
duties of a court regarding sentencing in view of section 28(2) of
the Constitution, and where the person being sentenced was the
primary caregiver of minor children.
The Constitutional Court held that the ambit of section 28 of the
Constitution was undoubtedly wide and that law enforcement
must consequently always be child sensitive. Section 28 should
also be placed within the context of South Africa's international
obligations as a party to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. What united these principles and lay at the
heart of section 28 is the right of a child to be a child and to enjoy
special care: 'Every child has his or her own dignity. If a child is to
be constitutionally imagined as an individual with a distinctive
personality, and not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach
full size, he or she cannot be treated as a mere extension of his or
her her parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim with them'
(para [18]).
Section 28(2) further provides an expansive guarantee that a
child's best interests will be paramount in every matter concern-
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ing the child, including the imposition of a just sentence for the
primary caregiver of minor children (paras [22]-[26]). Put differ-
ently, focused and informed attention need to be given to the
interests of children at appropriate moments in the sentencing
process; the sentencing court must be in a position adequately to
balance all the varied interests, including those of any minor
children placed at risk. The form of punishment imposed should
ultimately be the one that is least damaging to the interests of
children, given the legitimate range of choices available to the
sentencing court. The Constitutional Court also emphasized that
the purpose of highlighting the duty of a court to acknowledge the
interests of children during the sentencing phase of criminal
proceedings is not to allow errant parents the opportunity to avoid
punishment; rather, the primary aim of this duty is to protect
innocent children from avoidable harm.
The court provided the following guidelines for sentencing
where minor children are involved in order to promote uniformity
of principle, consistency of treatment, and individualization of
outcome. In the first instance, a sentencing court should deter-
mine whether an accused is the primary caregiver of a family.
Secondly, the court should, if imprisonment is a just possible
sentence in a particular case, ascertain what the effect of such a
custodial sentence will be on the minor children involved. If,
based on the 'Zinn triad approach' - which requires the court,
during sentencing, to consider the crime, the offender, and the
interests of society - the appropriate sentence is clearly custo-
dial and the convicted person is indeed the primary caregiver of
a family, the court must apply its mind as to whether it is
necessary to take steps to ensure that the minor children will
adequately be cared for while the caregiver is incarcerated.
Where the appropriate sentence is non-custodial, however, the
sentence must be determined while bearing in mind the interests
of the children. Thirdly, if there are a range of appropriate
sentences, the court must use the paramountcy principle as a
guideline when it decides which sentence to impose (paras
[33]-[36]).
The two competing considerations that must be weighed by a
court dealing with the sentencing of a convicted person who is
also the primary caregiver of minor children are, in the first
instance, the importance of maintaining the integrity of family
care, and, secondly, the State's duty to punish criminal conduct.
It should also be kept in mind that both the community and
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children, generally, have a substantial interest in seeing that laws
are obeyed and that criminal conduct is appropriately penalized
(paras [37]-[42]).
See also S v Maluleke 2008 (1) SACR 49 (T) and Petersen
(supra).
Compensatory Order
In S v Mgabhi 2008 (2) SACR 377 (D), the accused was
convicted of driving a motor vehicle without a driver's licence and
of negligent driving. These charges arose from an incident where
a woman was seriously injured as a result of a collision. At the
hearing on sentence, the husband of the injured woman indi-
cated that he would like to apply for compensation in terms of
section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act. As the accused was
a student without any resources, the accused's father, the owner
of the vehicle, indicated that he would assist with the payment
of compensation. The magistrate consequently imposed a fine of
R2 000 or six months' imprisonment, plus a further three years'
imprisonment suspended on the condition that the accused
compensate the complainant in an amount of R30 000 at a rate of
R1 000 per month.
On automatic review it was held that the magistrate had erred
in making the suspension of the sentence subject to the
accused's paying compensation to the complainant, primarily
because it was impermissible to make an award of compensation
subject, in the alternative, to a sentence of imprisonment, and as
it was plain that the accused was in no position to pay such
compensation. The magistrate also provided for the accused's
father to pay compensation, which was highly irregular, as the
magistrate did not have the power to make such an order. Section
300 (especially subsections (2) and (4)) clarifies that the accused
is the only person against whom an award of compensation can
be made. This also accords with the principle that a magistrate in
a criminal case has jurisdiction only over the accused and no
other person (paras [7]-[10] and [13]).
It was further held that the present case was not appropriate for
making a compensatory award, as the Road Accident Fund Act
56 of 1996 was obliged to compensate the woman for any loss
and damages. In terms of section 21 of the Act, the injured
woman was not entitled to claim compensation in respect of her
loss and/or damage from either the accused or his father, as
driver and owner of the vehicle, respectively. Section 300 of the
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Criminal Procedure Act cannot be used to circumvent this
restriction imposed by the Road Accident Fund Act (paras
[14]-[16]). The compensatory award was accordingly set aside.
Confiscation
In S v Shaik & others 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC), the first appellant
was convicted on two counts of corruption and one of fraud in
terms of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992. The remaining ten
appellants were companies associated with the first appellant.
They were convicted on various counts of corruption and fraud
and sentenced to the payment of fines in varying amounts. The
High Court also granted confiscation orders against certain of
the appellants' property in terms of section 18 of the POCA.
The Constitutional Court stressed one of the objectives of the
POCA - no person convicted of an offence should benefit from
the fruits of that or any related offence. Legislation is thus
necessary to provide for a civil remedy for the restraint, seizure,
and confiscation of property that forms the benefit derived from
such an offence. The rationale of a confiscation provision is
accordingly that by preventing the enjoyment of the proceeds of
crimes it deters people from joining the ranks of criminals. A
secondary purpose of the provision is to remove from the hands
of criminals the financial means necessary to commit and partake
in further criminal activities (paras [51]-[52] and [57]).
Section 12(3) of the POCA states that a person has benefitted
from unlawful activities if he or she received or retained any
proceeds of such unlawful activities. What constitutes a benefit
depends on whether that person received or retained any
proceeds of the unlawful activities in which he or she was
involved. Also, what constitutes a benefit is defined by reference
to what constitutes the 'proceeds of unlawful activities'. Section
18(2) of the Act consequently expressly states that a confiscation
order be made in respect of any property that falls within the
broader definition of what constitutes a benefit received or
retained from the proceeds of unlawful activities, and it is not
limited to a net amount (para [60]). Accordingly, where the
acquisition of shares in a company is a benefit received from a
crime, the shares and the dividends on them can be confiscated
under section 18 of the POCA (paras [59] and [62]).
Section 18 further confers a discretion upon a court to deter-
mine the appropriate amount that it should order a defendant to
pay. Such a determination is made once a court has convicted
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the accused of a criminal offence and at approximately the same
time as it imposes a sentence upon the person. '[G]iven the close
connection between the criminal conviction and the confiscation
order, it is apt that the discretion conferred upon the sentencing
court by s 18 be considered for the purposes of appellate
jurisdiction in the same light as the imposition of sentence' (para
[67]). This determination will be interfered with by an appellate
court only if the court is satisfied that the court below acted
unjudicially or misdirected itself, or where the appellate court is of
the view that the amount confiscated is disturbingly inappropriate
(ibid).
A court considering what will constitute an appropriate amount
to be confiscated as contemplated in section 18 must first have
regard to all the circumstances of the specific criminal activity,
and then consider what will be appropriate in terms of the
definition of the 'proceeds of unlawful activities' in the Act.
(The definition actually makes it possible for a court to confiscate
property that has not directly been acquired through the commis-
sion of crimes, and also makes it possible to confiscate property
that has been acquired not through crimes of which the defen-
dant has been convicted but through related criminal activity.)
One of the key considerations is the extent to which the property
to be confiscated derived directly from the criminal activities. In
this regard, courts should also take cognisance of the methods
criminals use to disguise the profits of their crime. The nature of
the crimes that fall within the express contemplation of the
Act constitutes a third consideration relevant to determining
what constitutes an 'appropriate' amount - the closer the crimes
or criminal activity concerned to the ambit of organized crime, the
more likely that the appropriate amount constitutes all the pro-
ceeds of the unlawful activities defined in the Act (paras
[69]-[71]).
Forfeiture
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Vermaak 2008 (1)
SACR 157 (SCA), the respondent had been convicted on two
counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The
appellant consequently applied to the High Court for an order
that the motor vehicle of the respondent be declared forfeit to the
State in terms of the POCA. The court refused the application. It
held that the POCA did not apply to the offence in question and
that a motor vehicle cannot be described as 'instrumental' to an
offence.
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Previously, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van
Staden & others 2007 (1) SACR 338 (SCA), the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that the POCA did apply to individual criminal
wrongdoing and that its provisions went beyond the boundaries
of 'organized crime' (here, offences that had an organizational
feature of some kind) (also National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; National Director of Public
Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd & another;
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2004 (2)
SACR 208 (SCA)). However, in Mohunram & another v National
Director of Public Prosecutions & another (Law Review Project as
amicus curiae) 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC), the Constitutional Court
was unable to find that the POCA (and chapter 6 in particular)
applied to individual criminal wrongdoing, and a majority of the
bench expressly left the question open (also National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Van Staden & others 2007 (1) SACR 338
(SCA)).
It is well established that an order for forfeiture can be made
only if the deprivation in a particular case is proportionate to the
aims of the Act. An order of forfeiture operates as both a penalty
and a deterrent, with its primary purpose being remedial. Forfei-
ture is aimed at crippling or inhibiting criminal activity, and it is in
this light that the discretion to order forfeiture should be exer-
cised. Forfeiture is most likely to have its greatest remedial effect
where crime has become business. But where the offence was
not committed in the course of ongoing criminal activity, the
ordinary criminal remedies are quite capable of serving the pur-
pose of deterrence. And, if the sentences that are available to
serve that purpose are inadequate, it is open to Parliament
to remedy that defect (paras [9]-[12]).
With regard to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the available sentences are quite capable of having the neces-
sary deterrent effect. While it is true that without the vehicle the
offender cannot again commit the offence, the reality is that
forfeiture in this context functions as little more than an additional
penalty. Only in very special circumstances would the forfeiture of
a vehicle in such circumstances be proportionate to the commis-
sion of the offence (para [14]). In the present case, the Supreme
Court of Appeal found that the circumstances did not justify a
forfeiture order. The core of the respondent's problem was not
reckless conduct or deliberate defiance of the law but rather
alcohol abuse. Accordingly, forfeiture of the vehicle in this
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instance would function as no more than an additional penalty
(para [19]).
Restorative justice and Notions ofAfrican Customary Law
In S v Malu/eke (supra), the sentencing of the accused, a
woman convicted of murdering a young man who broke into her
house, provided for an interesting new approach to sentencing,
one that involves notions of restorative justice and African cus-
tomary law. The accused was responsible for the death of the
victim by actively participating in a sustained assault upon
the deceased after having apprehended him in her home. The
accused lived in a very small, close-knit community in a rural area
in Limpopo and the deceased, a member of her extended family,
was well known to her. The sentencing of the accused posed
particular problems as the accused was the primary care giver of
four minor children. She was unemployed and her only income
was a child grant.
The court found that the accused was not a person against
whom society had to be protected - she showed remorse for her
actions, there was no real danger that her crime would be
repeated, and she was not normally a violent person. During
evidence in mitigation, the defence also investigated the question
whether the accused had, prior to the trial, complied with the
traditional custom of her community of apologizing for the taking
of the deceased's life by sending an elder member (or mem-
bers) of her family to the deceased's family. When she was asked
whether she had complied with this traditional custom, she
answered in the negative. (According to custom, failure to offer
such an apology would normally be regarded as adding insult to
the injury to the victim's family (para [18]).) During cross-exami-
nation and when the defence enquired from her whether she
would be prepared to receive such an apology, the victim's
mother indicated that she would actually be willing to accept the
apology if the accused also explained to her why she had killed
her son (para [19]). The court saw this affirmative answer as an
opportunity to involve the community in the sentencing and
rehabilitation process of the accused. The court sentenced the
accused to eight years' imprisonment, all of which was sus-
pended for three years on condition that the accused apologized,
according to custom, to the mother of the deceased and her
family within one month of the imposition of the sentence (para
[22]).
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In this case, the court used principles of restorative justice and
notions of African customary law. It held that the introduction of
traditional, indigenous legal principles in at least part of the
criminal justice system will extend the existing alternatives to
punishment and specifically imprisonment (para [39]). The incor-
poration of restorative justice principles will also contribute
significantly to combat recidivism and may become an important
tool in reconciling victim and offender, and the community and
the offender (para [34]).
See also S v Shibulane 2008 (1) SACR 295 (T).
Retrospective Effect of Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
In S v Shaik & others 2008 (1) SACR 1 (CC), the first applicant
was convicted on two counts of corruption and one of fraud in
terms of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992. He was sentenced to an
effective fifteen years' imprisonment (the minimum sentence in
terms of section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997). It was contended, inter alia, that the prescribed
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act ought
not to have been invoked, as the initial commission of the
particular crime predated the advent of that legislation.
The Constitutional Court recognized that a complaint against
the alleged retrospective application of the minimum-sentence
legislation clearly raised a constitutional issue (para [71]). It also
held that a proper approach to sentencing required that the
historical context of all the relevant circumstances be consid-
ered. From the evidence before the court it was evident that both
the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal had due regard
to the first applicant's personal circumstances. He became
involved in criminal activities after the dawn of democracy and
continued with his criminal activities long after legislation had
been enacted that furthered the interests of parties who had pre-
viously suffered discrimination. It was held that South Africa's
oppressive and discriminatory past could not be used as an
excuse for the commission of crime, or to justify a reduction in an
otherwise appropriate sentence, except under rare and excep-
tion circumstances. The court accordingly held that there were no
prospects of success on appeal on this ground (paras [75]-[77]).
With regard to the alleged retrospective application of the
minimum-sentence legislation, the first charge of corruption
concerned the giving of benefits to a particular person over a
period of time that transcended the commencement of the
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Criminal Law Amendment Act. Also, corruption is generally
regarded as an ongoing offence, and as the offences committed
after the commencement of the Act exceeded the statutory
threshold of R500 000, there was no logical reason why the
minimum-sentence legislation should not apply. There were con-
sequently no prospects of success on appeal on this ground
(paras [81] and [82]).
Right to Adduce Evidence
After the accused in S v Mbhele 2008 (1) SACR 123 (N) was
convicted of assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, he
elected to address the court in mitigation of his sentence in terms
of section 272(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The accused
called his brother and mother as witnesses, but the magistrate
dominated the questioning and the accused was not given an
opportunity to put questions to these witnesses and elicit such
evidence as he wished. The magistrate asked the two witnesses
what sentence they would like the court to impose, and merely
asked the accused whether he confirmed the testimony of each
of the witnesses.
A mere invitation as to whether an accused confirms the
evidence of his or her witnesses was found to be improper and to
fall far short of the right of an accused to adduce evidence on
sentence, in terms of section 274 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Denying an accused the opportunity to elicit from his witnesses
whatever evidence the accused believed his witnesses could
contribute was a serious irregularity, infringing an accused's
rights in terms of section 274, as well as an accused's right to a
fair trial (s 35(3) of the Constitution) (para [5]). It is further
undesirable and improper for a presiding officer to enquire from
lay witnesses what they would like the court to impose by way of a
sentence. Any answer to such a question was described by the
appeal court as irrelevant and inadmissible opinion evidence.
The matter was consequently referred back to the magistrate for
sentence to be imposed afresh (para [6]).
Weighing ofFactors
In S v Bignaut 2008 (1) SACR 78 (SCA), the appellant pleaded
guilty to and was convicted of one count of robbery with
aggravating circumstances, and one count of kidnapping. He
was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on the first count
and to five years' on the second; the two terms were to run
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concurrently. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the
regional magistrate had erred in several respects in his approach
to sentence. In the first instance, he had stated without elabora-
tion or specificity that there were aggravating circumstances. The
Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed. Secondly, the regional
magistrate wrongly characterized the appellant's conduct as an
attempt to perpetrate 'a popular crime'. He also emphasized the
community interest and deterrence, generally, but did not men-
tion the other traditional aims of sentencing, such as personal
deterrence, rehabilitation, and reformation. Thirdly, the many
mitigating factors present did not receive appropriate recognition
by the regional magistrate, and they were not balanced against
the perceived aggravating factors (para [6]). The appeal was
upheld and the sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment set aside
and substituted by a sentence of five years' imprisonment.
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